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1. If a conflict should break out between Yugoslavia and the Satellite countries backed by the Soviet Union, many observers believe that the Yugoslav Army would defend the territorial integrity of the country with courage.
2. Without wishing to minimize the fact that a certain patriotic sentiment exists among the Yugoslavs which might incite them to take up arms against an invader, it is necessary to recognize that such a manner of evaluating the circumstances might well be unrealistic. In the present situation there is room for serious doubts concerning both the morale of the Army and the kind of resistance which the Army would be capable of maintaining in case of war. This is so for the following reasons:
 - a. The patriotic feelings which were mentioned above do not exist in the form of Yugoslav patriotism; for the Serbs "la patrie" is still Serbia and not Yugoslavia; the same is true of the Croats. Both peoples have been able from time to time to be proud of the role played by Yugoslavia in the family of nations; but in the final analysis they remain attached to their respective nationalities; when one is trying to show many Yugoslavs the necessity of the country remaining unified, if only for economic reasons, they remain skeptical. For two years now it seems that the Serbs have had the tendency to rely on themselves, and the Croats have never felt very allied to the other nationalities. It also must be kept in mind that the two resistance groups which developed in the country and which for a time waged a common battle against the occupier were differentiated much more by national criteria than by ideological considerations. The massacres perpetrated by the Ustashi have had a profound effect on the country which has not been erased by a common slavery under the boot of the Communists. The recent decentralization measures which have been taken can only accentuate these differences even more, particularly since these very

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differences were the cause of their promulgation.

- b. The Communist authorities who have always been conscious of these problems have tried in the military sphere to effect an amalgamation in order to forestall, in case of war, any such events as the revolt of the Croat regiments which occurred in 1941; recruits from Zagreb have, for example, been sent to Macedonia and are lead by Bosnian and Montenegrin officers; recruits from Serbia or the Vojvodina have spent their military service in Istria, Dalmatia, or Slovenia. Slovenes have been called to service in old Serbia and are officered by people who do not often speak their language. All of this has not brought about homogenous units but has developed friction between men and officers.
 - c. Numerous cliques within the officer corps still suffer from the Cominform sickness of 1948. The brutal repression which has hit many general and high ranking officers has broken the ideological unity of the Army ranks. The introduction, by feeding tube it is true, of reserve elements of the old opposition (i.e. Royalists) and reinstatement in their former ranks increased the number of opportunists.
3. In short the political situation in the country as a whole makes it difficult to expect determined resistance from the Yugoslav Army. The peasants at this time have not the slightest intention of fighting for Tito. Every explanation which could be given to them in order to make them fight with courage is doomed to failure. They have a Communist regime and the contrary can not be proven to them as long as their private property is not restored. Their very simple reasoning makes them see things as follows: on one hand, the Red Star, be it Tito's or Stalin's, is a symbol of collectivized property; on the other hand, the White Star of the Americans or Western Powers is a symbol of private property and of a return to individual independence.
 4. The Russian scarecrow which has been placed before their eyes has not greatly impressed them; if the city-dwelling Yugoslavs had to suffer the impositions of the Red Army, the peasants themselves suffered much less from them; the requisitioning ordered on behalf of the Soviet forces was carried out by Yugoslavs and this increased their anti-Communist hatred, but did not bring about any specifically anti-Russian resentment.
 5. Recent measures taken by the regime on behalf of the peasants, abandoning obligatory collections in particular, have not yet succeeded in convincing the peasantry that things have changed. Only radical measures, such as restoring their former rights, would convince them that Yugoslavia and its present government was worth defending; but even if this should happen tomorrow it would still take time before they would abandon their distrust of a regime which has led them into ruin and placed them in poverty. (It should be noted in this regard that contrary to what happened in France during the occupation, where poverty was unequally suffered by the city-dwelling population and the inhabitants of the country, the latter being obviously favored, the situation is exactly reversed in Yugoslavia and the peasants are forced to buy their own family grain on the black market.)
 6. The middle classes, who have been victimized also by Communism, realize much better that if Tito continues in the path he seems to be following now, it might be worth the effort to defend his regime by arms. Unhappily the suffering which they have undergone in the last five years has brought them to the point where if they were to have arms and ammunition tomorrow they would doubtless turn them on the former oppressors (i.e. the Communists). When one tries to explain to them that all of the Western nations must make a common front against the East and make an effort to use the Tito regime for the best of their own interests and to cease trying to rid themselves of it until later, these people answer: "No, not later, but right away." They have become very suspicious and each time that they learn that another loan has just been made to their country they become highly indignant and ask why the Western Powers do not place

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conditions (on these loans): "You are in the process of consolidating the Tito regime; without you, he could not resist. Are you sure that tomorrow Yugoslavia, having refloated its economy, thanks to you, will not reverse itself and declare null and void all the concessions she is obliged to make today?"

7. The working classes, which constitute a weak portion of the population in Yugoslavia have not obtained advantages for themselves sufficient to lead to the hope that they would fight with determination. The only active elements are unhappily the Cominformists who spread among their comrades rumors of a subversive nature which tend to make them believe that real Communism, that is, Stalin's brand, can really bring happiness to the working class. These elements, in contrast to the opposition oriented toward the West, feel themselves solidly backed by Moscow. The rest of the working class is enclosed in a very Slavic fatalism and patriotic exhortations have very little effect on them.
8. In the case of conflict it can be seen that the Yugoslav troops are in danger of not being able to furnish the resistance that one would expect from their numbers. Mobilization could be marked by serious troubles; unit rebellions, disorders, Cominformist sabotage, and desertions, without mentioning the grave political problems which could result. If the onslaught of the enemy was heavy, it can be imagined that the Yugoslav Army would never recover and only a few units would be able to fight effectively. In case the situation should develop more slowly or the Allies could intervene directly in the country, then there is no doubt that all elements capable of resistance would be inspired and would recapture their traditional warrior virtues; but for that to happen, the Yugoslavs would have to be able to see with their own eyes the Sherman tanks, the planes with Allied markings and to realize that it is not quite Tito alone who running things, but beside him there are people who would never again give him liberty to act in his own arbitrary fashion.
9. But, supposing that the outcome of the initial encounters were such that under the pressure of Soviet troops intervening, directly or indirectly, and under the pressure of internal disorders, which are likely to happen, Yugoslav military resistance as such were to cease, then one can be sure that a resistance movement as fierce as that of World War II fame would be born again in Yugoslavia.

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